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Hotel, Motel, and Resort Distress Risk Ranking
Risk view across hotel, motel, resort, lodging, and accommodation owner-operator companies tied to distress, litigation, defaults, violations, and operating incidents. Food-chain companies are excluded.
Updated July 9, 2026
Risk view
Showing rows 41-60 of 199; 20 rows per page.
| Rank | Company | Score | Thesis / Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 41 | Greenbrier Resort highstrong | Score 7 Opp 1 Risk 8 | Thesis: Greenbrier Resort faces direct debt-dispute and control risk: the Justice family sued to block a creditor-backed takeover, roughly $289 million in loans had been sold to White Sulphur Springs Holdings, and receivership was being pursued. Allegations of waste/fraud/abuse add reputational pressure. The main article was reported on April 14, 2026. Why now: The resort was in an active ownership/control dispute in April 2026, and for a 1 year+ horizon a receivership fight and large debt burden can remain highly relevant. The clinic-related lawsuit article was crawled earlier on April 9, 2026, but that is weaker/contextual to the hotel thesis than the debt-control dispute. Evidence
Caveats: Some dated rows are attached to related entities within the same article, so direct company-specific grounding is strongest for the takeover/debt dispute itself. The New York Giants training-camp relocation is neutral context, not strong positive evidence. The clinic lawsuit is weaker hotel-thesis context than the debt/receivership dispute. |
| 42 | Hotel Fast SSE AB (publ) mediummedium | Score 7 Opp 1 Risk 8 | Thesis: Hotel Fast SSE AB (publ) shows severe distress indicators highly relevant to the hotel-risk lens: observation status due to uncertainty around its financial position, preparation of a liquidation balance sheet, failure to meet ongoing operations listing requirements, and stated Nasdaq intent to delist the company on May 23, 2026 unless a credible plan emerged. This looks like a financially and operationally impaired hotel company rather than a transient headline. Citations Why now: The articles were reported on April 6, 2026 and April 7, 2026 and describe contemporaneous listing-status deterioration, including intended delisting on May 23, 2026 and updated observation status tied to financial-position uncertainty and lack of ongoing operations. Those are material state-change events for the 1 year+ horizon. Citations Evidence
Caveats: the evidence does not include a later-dated article confirming whether delisting ultimately occurred or was avoided. Opportunity evidence is neutral/management-intent, not proof of successful remediation. Coverage universe is very small. |
| 43 | Hotel Rajshree mediummedium | Score 7 Opp 1 Risk 8 | Thesis: Hotel Rajshree is directly tied to accommodation-property safety risk: local reporting says sewage was flowing into hotels/buildings near Bhopal Junction, the buildings are old and dilapidated, prior survey work warned of collapse risk from seepage, and upcoming underground metro tunneling could add vibration-related stress. This fits the stated focus on safety/code/property risk and could remain relevant over a 1 year+ horizon if structural remediation and tunneling proceed. Why now: The relevant articles were reported on April 7, 2026, and one article states underground tunnel excavation was to begin soon, making the risk time-relevant within the recent evidence window even though several dated evidence are marked undated. Evidence
Caveats: evidence polarity appears misfiled: adverse dated items are placed under direct_positive_evidence, so direction was inferred from the claims themselves. Most dated evidence are marked undated despite article-level timestamps/source dates on April 7, 2026. Source is local news with modest credibility and no quantified financial impact. |
| 44 | Hotel Red Sea Plaza mediummedium | Score 7 Opp 1 Risk 8 | Thesis: Hotel Red Sea Plaza appears exposed to the same accommodation-property safety risk cluster as Hotel Rajshree: sewage intrusion, an old/dilapidated building profile, prior collapse warnings from seepage, and future tunneling vibrations from metro work. That combination supports a high risk score under the user’s hotel safety/code/distress focus. Why now: Both relevant articles were reported on April 7, 2026 and discuss collapse risk as underground tunnel excavation was approaching, making this a potentially durable risk over the next year if the underlying structural issues are unresolved. Evidence
Caveats: evidence evidence for this company mirrors Rajshree and even contains entity-name inconsistencies, so company-specific attribution is somewhat weaker than ideal. dated adverse items are placed under direct_positive_evidence in the evidence; direction was inferred from claim text. No quantified business, insurance, closure, or occupancy impact is provided. |
| 45 | InterGroup Corporation highstrong | Score 5 Opp 3 Risk 8 | Thesis: InterGroup is one of the strongest hotel-risk candidates in the screen because the evidence directly states significant debt burden, interest-rate/refinancing sensitivity, and lender-controlled cash management restricting cash flow from the hotel property to the parent until debt-service coverage requirements are met. That is directly aligned with hotel loan/default/lender-stress themes. Evidence: 'significant debt burden and sizable interest obligations' increasing sensitivity to rates and refinancing; lender-controlled cash management restricts cash flow to parent until DSCR requirements are met; ongoing San Francisco market headwinds include reduced business travel, safety concerns, homelessness, and crime. Why now: Why now is that the clearest evidence evidence is recent and company-specific: a May 29, 2026 Nasdaq article summarized both improved operations and continuing debt/cash-flow restrictions, while Q3 FY2026 results published/crawled in mid-May 2026 confirmed the operating recovery has not removed lender control risk (article_timestamp May 29, 2026; article_timestamp May 11, 2026). Evidence
Caveats: Most direct risk evidence comes from one primary article, so same-article points are not independent confirmation. The company also showed meaningful hotel operating recovery, which tempers but does not remove distress risk. evidence coverage is small, though still adequate because the key evidence is direct and company-specific. |
| 46 | Kansas Hotels LLC mediummedium | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: Kansas Hotels LLC shows highly relevant current hotel distress: the Radisson Hotel in Lenexa was condemned for mold contamination, fire code violations and unpermitted construction, and the mortgage holder then filed a foreclosure lawsuit seeking control and sale of the property. A separate article says only 24 of 144 rooms passed inspection and the owner sued the city over the condemnation. Why now: This is the most recent dated company-specific hotel risk in the screen: Kansas City Star is dated July 2, 2026 and says the foreclosure suit came only two weeks after the city deemed the hotel unsafe; the earlier May 5, 2026 article documents condemnation and litigation. Evidence
Caveats: No dated direct negative event row is available; assessment relies on article summaries/context. The owner’s lawsuit to reopen is not positive evidence; it may indicate active remediation effort but not resolution. Need caution because supporting article context is weaker than dated event/fact evidence. |
| 47 | LOGE Holdings mediummedium | Score 6 Opp 2 Risk 8 | Thesis: High hotel-specific risk because a directly cited event says LOGE abruptly closed several properties in early 2026, a material accommodation-business disruption that fits the user's hotel distress lens and can have durable operating, lender, and reputational consequences over a 1 year+ horizon. Why now: The relevant article was reported on May 13, 2026 and states that in early 2026 LOGE had already abruptly closed several properties; the same May 13, 2026 article also shows post-distress transition activity as Gravity Haus took management of three former LOGE hotels, indicating the distress has moved beyond rumor into asset/operator turnover. Evidence
Caveats: Only one article is in the evidence, so corroboration is limited. The positive and negative points come from the same article and are not independent confirmation. The positive item primarily describes successor management by Gravity Haus, not a recovery by LOGE itself. |
| 48 | Main Street Motel LLC highmedium | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: A recent Chapter 11 filing is direct company-specific distress evidence under the focus on motel bankruptcy risk. Why now: The kept article was published June 24, 2026 and identifies Main Street Motel LLC as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case filed that same day in the New York Eastern Bankruptcy Court, making this a very recent distress event within the recent evidence window. Evidence
Caveats: Only one article is provided. the evidence gives the bankruptcy filing but not the underlying causes, assets, or expected recovery path. Evidence is article-level court-case context rather than a richer dated event set. |
| 49 | MGM Muthu Hotels highstrong | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: Direct dated evidence shows MGM Muthu Hotels alleging that county enforcement officers restricted tourist movement at its Maasai Mara lodge, creating operational, legal, and investor-protection risk around a hotel asset. Why now: The article was reported on April 27, 2026, within the recent evidence window, and the dispute concerns hotel access and tourist movement, which can have durable operational and reputational effects over a 1 year+ horizon if unresolved. Evidence
Caveats: Claims are framed as allegations and the summary notes county officials had not responded. Only one underlying article supports the event. The event row itself is marked undated even though the representative article has a source date; recency-sensitive interpretation should stay cautious. |
| 50 | Micasa Homes highstrong | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: Micasa Homes has direct dated negative evidence tied to a deadly nearby B&B fire that killed 21 people, after which nearby guest houses including Micasa Homes closed, removed signage, and asked guests to leave. This is directly within the safety-incident and operational-disruption hotel accommodation risk focus and can have durable reputational, regulatory, and occupancy effects. Why now: The dated evidence event-date metadata is 2026-06 and the representative article was crawled at June 3, 2026, so this is recent within the recent evidence window risk involving fatalities and immediate local business shutdown behavior. Evidence
Caveats: The fire occurred at Flourish Stay B&B, not explicitly at Micasa Homes itself; Micasa Homes' direct evidence is closure/disruption as a nearby accommodation business. No quantified financial damage is provided. The duration of shutdown is not specified. |
| 51 | Minor International PCL highstrong | Score 4 Opp 4 Risk 8 | Thesis: Minor has direct hotel-operational risk within the recent evidence window because Anantara World Islands Dubai Resort ceased operations/permanently closed effective April 10, 2026, and it also faces demand pressure from Middle East conflict affecting bookings and air travel into Q2-Q4 2026. Why now: The negative operational event is specifically dated April 10, 2026 and multiple related articles were crawled or published in April 2026; later May-June 2026 evidence adds that Q2 conditions may worsen due to oil prices and airfares, so the risk is both recent and potentially durable across the next year. Evidence
Caveats: Minor’s broad positive evidence is not tightly connected to the user’s hotel distress lens, so opportunity is intentionally discounted. Some positive items are undated dated rows or long-dated pipeline items opening in 2028-2032. One risk item about Trojena project dependency uses a lower-quality source and is not necessary to the core thesis. |
| 52 | Mollyockett Motel mediummedium | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: The motel is described as entering foreclosure and heading to a July 22, 2026 foreclosure auction, which is directly within the user's focus on accommodation foreclosures. Why now: The auction timing is near-dated within the evidence window and highly relevant to a 1 year+ distress assessment because foreclosure typically changes ownership or operating status; articles published June 19 and June 26, 2026 both point to the July 22, 2026 auction (article, article). Evidence
Caveats: Evidence is external article context only; no dated direct negative event row is provided. One source is a Craigslist auction posting, which is informative but not a top-tier news source. No later post-auction outcome is included. |
| 53 | NH/Minor mediummedium | Score 7 Opp 1 Risk 8 | Thesis: NH/Minor is exposed to a sanctions-driven hotel operating pullback in Cuba, fitting the user's hotel regulatory/operational risk focus. The article directly says NH/Minor had already pulled back amid a US Treasury deadline to sever ties with GAESA or face secondary sanctions. Why now: The evidence is recent and event-driven: the article dated June 5, 2026 discusses a June 5 sanctions deadline, making the regulatory pressure immediate in timing even though the NH/Minor-specific pullback fact is not separately dated within the article. Evidence
Caveats: The negative event row is group-linked to Iberostar rather than directly named as NH/Minor in the dated event field. There is only one article in the evidence for this company. No direct quantified financial impact on NH/Minor is provided. |
| 54 | Ofland Hotels highstrong | Score 6 Opp 2 Risk 8 | Thesis: Ofland Hotels shows direct, recent hotel-project distress: it abandoned plans for a luxury eco-resort near Joshua Tree, with the article stating softening market demand drove the retreat and noting changed financial conditions and lawsuit allegations over environmental review. That is directly aligned with accommodation-project execution and financial-risk concerns. Why now: The adverse event is recent within the recent evidence window, with article_timestamp April 30, 2026 based on exact source reporting, and it reflects a business-state change from planned expansion to project abandonment. Evidence
Caveats: Positive evidence is lower materiality and from a press-release source. The lawsuit reference is in article summary/context; the clearest direct negative evidence is project abandonment tied to demand and financial conditions. |
| 55 | Rochester Airport Marriott highmedium | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: Recent article-level evidence ties the hotel to foreclosure, a $14.5 million loan default, and a new lawsuit, directly matching the ranking focus. Why now: The kept article was published April 29, 2026 and states the hotel is facing foreclosure after an owner default on a $14.5 million loan and is at the center of a new lawsuit, making the distress current within the recent evidence window. Evidence Caveats: Only one article is provided. Evidence is supporting article context rather than dated direct-negative event rows. the evidence does not indicate whether foreclosure has advanced to sale, receivership, or settlement. |
| 56 | SAICP HOTEL, LLC mediummedium | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: SAICP HOTEL, LLC filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Central District of California on April 30, 2026, with assets and liabilities both reported in the $50MM-$100MM range, and the article summary also notes a June 25, 2026 motion for relief from stay related to real property. That combination is highly relevant to hotel loan default/foreclosure/restructuring risk and suggests an ongoing real-estate distress process rather than a resolved filing. Citation: published_at/article timestamp April 30, 2026; same article summary includes the June 25, 2026 relief-from-stay docket item. Why now: The filing occurred on April 30, 2026 and the same source summary notes a June 25, 2026 motion for relief from stay on real property, indicating continuing bankruptcy-case activity within the recent evidence window and supporting 1 year+ risk persistence. Citation Evidence
Caveats: Evidence is external article context rather than dated direct negative event rows. Only one article is provided. the evidence does not provide resolution status, debtor strategy, or final asset outcome. |
| 57 | Seaview Investors LLC highstrong | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: Seaview Investors LLC is tied to a directly on-theme hotel distress event: a Residence Inn by Marriott LAX was placed in receivership after Seaview defaulted on about $45 million of debt, and Seaview reportedly consented to the receiver. A follow-on article says 2024 net cash flow was 38% below underwriting, reinforcing operating underperformance behind the default. Why now: The receivership/default evidence is dated June 1-2, 2026 and remains relevant on a 1 year+ horizon because hotel receiverships and lender hand-backs often have lasting implications. The June 12 LinkedIn repost is weaker than the source articles and not independent confirmation. Evidence
Caveats: Evidence is from the external supporting context. the evidence's dated rows classify the strongest support as neutral fact/context, so direction comes from the article substance rather than explicit negative polarity fields. Some additional items are reposts or profile pages and should not be treated as independent confirmation. |
| 58 | Sherwood Palm Hotel highstrong | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: This is the clearest in-scope, in-recent evidence window risk case in the evidence. Sherwood Palm Hotel has direct negative event evidence of a second fire in three days, associated safety concerns, investigation/scrutiny, prior fire damage, and recent closure due to anti-social behavior, all pointing to sustained operational, safety, and reputational risk for a hotel accommodation property. Why now: Why now is strong because the relevant articles were reported on April 7, 2026 and April 8, 2026, within the recent evidence window, and the direct negative event rows describe repeated fires and active scrutiny as contemporaneous conditions. Citations Evidence
Caveats: Source quality is low in the evidence. Two articles are closely related and may not be fully independent. No quantified financial impact, insurance outcome, or lender response is provided. |
| 59 | Shilo Management Corporation highstrong | Score 8 Opp 0 Risk 8 | Thesis: Direct bankruptcy risk is acute: a Shilo Inn property owned by Shilo Management converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 on April 24, 2026, with immediate shutdown of the hotel and onsite businesses. The article also describes longer-running back-tax and default-judgment history, reinforcing a durable distress thesis. Why now: The conversion to Chapter 7 is a dated adverse event on April 24, 2026, and the article was reported on April 30, 2026, signaling a current liquidation state rather than a historical restructuring headline. Evidence
Caveats: Single-article evidence base. Some supporting distress history in the evidence is undated and older, so the Chapter 7 event should carry more weight than the older background. |
| 60 | Simba Group mediummedium | Score 6 Opp 2 Risk 8 | Thesis: Simba Group has substantial hotel-related financing and litigation risk. the evidence directly links Simba/Bitature to an ongoing debt dispute with Vantage Mezzanine Fund, a prior loan default, arbitration against Bitature, and court enforcement activity, while the relevant asset base includes hotel properties such as Protea Hotel by Marriott Naguru Skyz and Elgon Terrace Hotel. This is directly in-scope for hotel loan default/lawsuit risk, though some evidence is undated and therefore current-state precision is weaker than for Iberostar. Why now: the evidence says the Uganda Court of Appeal allowed enforcement in 2025 and the Supreme Court granted temporary relief, while an article dated April 29, 2026 summarized the debt dispute as ongoing. A separate article dated April 30, 2026 discussed a UK charging order enforcing an award above $25 million. That places the dispute in a still-active legal phase during the recent evidence window. Evidence
Caveats: Several rows are marked undated, so recency-sensitive claims should be treated cautiously. The positive evidence is favorable to the creditor/enforcement process, not necessarily to Simba Group. No explicit foreclosure, bankruptcy filing, or hotel closure is provided. |